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A B S T R A C T  
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Standard neuroimaging techniques provide non-invasive access not only to human brain 
anatomy but also to its physiology. The activity recorded with these techniques is generally 
called functional imaging, but what is observed per se is an instance of dynamics, from which 
functional brain activity should be extracted. Distinguishing between bare dynamics and 
genuine function is a highly non-trivial task, but a crucially important one when comparing 
experimental observations and interpreting their significance. Here we illustrate how 
neuroimaging’s ability to extract genuine functional brain activity is bounded by functional 
representations’ structure. To do so, we first provide a simple definition of functional brain 
activity from a system-level brain imaging perspective. We then review how the properties of 
the space on which brain activity is represented allow defining relations ranging from 
distinguishability to accessibility of observed imaging data. We show how these properties 
result from the structure defined on dynamical data and dynamics-to-function projections, and 
consider some implications that the way and extent to which these are defined have for the 
interpretation of experimental data from standard system-level brain recording techniques. 
 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
System-level neuroimaging techniques 
such as PET and MRI make it possible to 
noninvasively access not only the 
anatomy of the human brain but also its 
physiology (Raichle, 2000). Brain activity 
recording with these techniques is 
generally called functional imaging, the 
term being equally applied to 
electrophysiological techniques such as 
EEG or MEG. However, observed activity is 
not genuinely functional per se, and 
neuroimaging data should a priori be 
treated as brain dynamics. Extracting 
functional brain activity from bare 
dynamics represents a non-trivial though 
often implicit process (Atmanspacher and 
beim Graben, 2007; Allefeld et al., 2009).  
It is often important to compare 
representations associated with different 
recording sessions from the same 
individual, different individuals, or 
experimental conditions. Comparisons 
can come in various forms, which can be 
expressed in terms of the question they 
address: when are two representations 
distinguishable? How far apart are they? 
What do neighbouring representations 
look like? Is a transition possible from a 
given representation to another?  
Here we illustrate how 
neuroimaging’s ability to address these 
questions is bounded by functional 
representations’ structure. To do so, we 
first provide a simple but convenient 
definition of functional brain activity from 
a system-level brain imaging perspective, 
a more comprehensive definition being 
beyond the scope of the present work. We 
then review how the properties of the 
space on which brain activity is 
represented allow defining properties 
ranging from distinguishability to 
accessibility. We show how these 
properties result from the structure 
defined on dynamical data and dynamics-
to-function projections, and consider 
some implications that the way and extent 
to which these are defined have for the 
interpretation of experimental data from 
standard system-level brain recording 
techniques. 
DEFINING FUNCTIONAL BRAIN ACTIVITY 
It is logical to understand functional 
activity as one associated with some 
function. Function can be defined as the 
ability to perform a given cognitive or 
physiological task, imposed by the 
environment. Insofar as individuals' 
behavioural performance can be thought 
of as resulting from brain properties, 
functional activity refers to both 
behaviour and neural structures. This 
double use reflects two complementary 
goals, i.e. understanding how brain 
anatomical structure and dynamics 
unfolding on it control function, and how 
performance of cognitive or physiological 
tasks acts on brain anatomy and dynamics, 
producing functional subdivisions in the 
brain. In the former, a space Ψ  of 
(typically non-observable) cognitive or 
physiological functions {𝜓1, 𝜓2 , … , 𝜓𝐽}  is 
described using a finite set 
{𝜑1, 𝜑2 , … , 𝜑𝐾} ∈ Φ𝑂𝑏𝑠  of carefully 
selected coarse-grained aspects of brain 
anatomy or physiology (reflecting at a 
macroscopic level neurophysiological 
phenomena Φ𝑁𝑂𝑏𝑠  not observable when 
using a given system-level neuroimaging 
technique) associated with observable 
fitness or performance measures 
{𝛾1, 𝛾2 , … , 𝛾𝐿} ∈ Γ from subjects at rest or 
carrying out given tasks. In the latter, the 
ability to carry out given tasks is used as a 
probe exposing information on brain 
properties Φ.  Each of these levels is in 
general endowed with some structure 𝒮, 
i.e. some relationship among its elements.  
Thus, defining functional brain activity 
using system-level neuroimaging 
techniques involves partitioning two 
complex spaces, respectively made 
observable by behaviour and brain 
recording techniques, putting a structure 
on the set of equivalence classes, and 
mapping the corresponding structures.  
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BRAIN PARCELLATION 
Characterizing functional activity is in 
essence a parcellation problem. When 
using Φ  to make sense of  Ψ , one 
ultimately aims at partitioning the space 
of cognitive functions 𝑓: Ψ → Ψ/, where 
Ψ = Ψ(Γ, Φ),  and Ψ/  is the space of 
equivalence classes under the relation .  
In the opposite case, Φ is partitioned into 
functionally meaningful units 𝑔: Φ → Φ/
′  using cognitive tasks as probes. This 
implies evaluating the sets 𝑈 = 𝜋−1(V), 
where 𝑈 Ψ, V Φ/′ , 𝜋: Ψ → Φ/′  and 
′  is a relation defined on Φ,  or the 
equivalent in the opposite case. Since 
typically 𝐿 ≪ 𝐾,  the structure on Φ  is 
finer than that on  Γ,  and physiology is 
more often used to define the cognitive 
space than the opposite case. Meaningful 
functional units correspond to the family 
of sets 𝒰𝜋 = {𝑈 = 𝜋
−1(V)}  (or, 
equivalently, 𝒱𝜋′ = {V = 𝜋
′−1(𝑈)}).  How 
to construct 𝒰𝜋  (or 𝒱𝜋′),  what form the 
corresponding space may take, and 
therefore what may be regarded as 
functional, depends on the way (Ψ, 𝒮Ψ) 
and (Φ, 𝒮Φ), where 𝒮  denotes a generic 
structure, are defined and mapped onto 
each other through 𝜋 (or 𝜋′). 
Classical neuropsychological 
descriptions map observed behaviour Γ 
onto the anatomical Euclidean space 𝔈, 
with orthonormal coordinates, so that 
Φ𝔈 ℝ
3.  Brain lesions induce a coarse 
partition Φ𝔈 𝐿⁄ . 𝒰𝜋  is extrapolated from 
the overlap between lesions and cortical 
areas, i.e. partitions defined on the 
anatomical space on the basis of 
cytoarchitecture, histological structure or 
organization homogeneity (Brodmann, 
1909), associated with a map Ψ → Φ𝔈, 
using double dissociations in conjunction 
with the assumption of modularity of both 
Φ𝔈 and Ψ (Dunn and Kirsner, 2003).  
System-level neuroimaging maps Ψ 
onto some recording technique-specific 
function of macroscopic observables 𝜑𝑖 ∈
Φ of brain physiology. Neuroimaging data 
are typically treated as (scalar, vector or 
tensor) fields ℱ = {𝑓𝑋(𝑠, 𝑡)}, where 𝑠 lives 
in a subspace isomorphic to ℝ3 and 𝑡 ∈ ℝ 
is the physical time, and described in 
terms of some convenient function of this 
field, in the spatial (anatomical), temporal, 
frequency domains or in the phase space 
(either of observed activity, considered as 
a dynamical system, at experimental time 
scales, or as a morphospace, e.g. at 
developmental or evolutionary time-
scales). On the other hand, while Γ  is 
typically a scalar or vector field, it can 
sometimes take the form a complex 
function space. 
Functional parcellations are defined in 
a recording technique- and scale-
dependent manner. For fast sensory 
processes, functional equivalence classes 
can be defined by characterizing the 
dynamical range, i.e. the range of stimulus 
intensities resulting in distinguishable 
neural responses, while the dynamical 
repertoire, i.e. the number of 
distinguishable responses, quantifies the 
functional phase space extension. How, 
viz. on what space and along what 
properties or relations to define 
distinguishability represents the most 
crucial questions. On the other hand, for 
processes such as thinking or reasoning, 
which lack a characteristic duration and 
trivial behavioural scales (Papo, 2015) the 
definition of functional but also dynamical 
partitions is less straightforward. For 
instance, Φ can be locally partitioned into 
quasi-stable spatiotemporal microstates 
(Lehman et al., 1987; Kaplan et al., 2005; 
Allegrini et al., 2010 ; van de Ville et al., 
2010; Hadriche et al., 2013; Watanabe et 
al., 2013), or into predictively equivalent 
sets induced by the causal states of the 
dynamics, with equivalence relations 
grouping all histories that give rise to the 
same prediction (Crutchfield et al., 2009); 
or, if one considers relationships between 
dynamics at different scales, parcellations 
may be universality classes, i.e. regions of 
the phase space sharing a single scale 
invariant limit under a renormalization 
group flow (Papo, 2014). In these latter 
cases, extracting function from observed 
dynamics is conceptually and technically 
arduous and involves understanding the 
structure of brain dynamics and how this 
can be used to ultimately define function. 
Superstructure of brain imaging representations 
The space on which parcellations are 
defined is in general endowed with some 
superstructure. First, brain anatomy and 
dynamics can be endowed with a network 
structure (Bullmore and Sporns, 2009), 
and, as a consequence, with topological 
properties (Boccaletti et al., 2006) and 
symmetries (Pecora et al., 2014). These 
induce multiple possible parcellations of 
the anatomical and dynamical spaces. 
Community structures constitute a 
particularly illustrative example of some 
important aspects worth mentioning in 
this context. First, community structures 
can come in qualitatively different forms 
(e.g. static or dynamic) and can be 
quantified in various different ways, 
corresponding to qualitatively different 
purposes (Schaub et al., 2018). For 
instance, fuzzy (Simas and Rocha 2015) or 
overlapping (Palla et al., 2005) 
community structures may be more 
appropriate than stricto sensu partitions 
of the space. Second, community 
structures can take a generalized form, as 
it is always possible to generate 
ensembles of networks with given 
properties inducing qualitatively different 
underlying spaces (Newman and Peixoto, 
2015). Third, community structure and, 
more generally, network structures 
indicate that parcellations may not 
necessarily be local in the anatomical 
space.  
Φ is typically embedded into the same 
anatomical Euclidean space (𝔈; 𝑑)  of 
classical neuropsychology, where 𝑑 is the 
usual metric. In the simplest case, it is de 
facto treated as a field (ℱ; 𝑑).  This 
translates the fact that, at least at the 
temporal scales at which anatomy 
represents a genuine boundary condition 
for brain anatomy and ultimately for the 
dynamics (Papo, 2017), the brain can be 
thought of as a spatial network 
(Barthélemy, 2011), reflecting the 
existence of geometric alongside 
topological constraints on the overall 
organization of brain anatomy and 
dynamics (Robinson, 2013b; Stiso and 
Bassett, 2018).  
While the anatomically-embedded 
dynamical space as a whole should not be 
regarded as homeomorphic to the 
Euclidean space ℝ𝑛 , it may be treated as 
almost everywhere locally isomorphic to 
it. One may then represent it as a 
topological manifold (X,C) i.e. as a 
paracompact topological space 𝑋 
equipped with an atlas, a cover C of open 
sets in which each C  C is homeomorphic 
to an open subset D  ℝ𝑛  through a map 
𝜑𝐶: C → D called a chart of C (Robinson, 
2013). Finally, whenever brain imaging 
data can effectively be treated as the 
output of a dynamical system, they may be 
modelled as a topological dynamical 
system, i.e. a triple (Φ, 𝒮, 𝑇𝑠), where Φ is a 
Hausdorff (separable) topological space, 
𝒮 a topological semigroup prescribing the 
matching conditions between overlapping 
local trivialization charts, and 𝑇𝒮  a 
continuous function 𝑇𝒮: 𝒮 × Φ → Φ. For 
instance, at long time scales, brain 
fluctuations are characterized by non-
trivial scaling properties such as scale-
invariance (Papo, 2013). The set of 
associated renormalization operators has 
a multiplicative semigroup structure on 
the time-scale space and a covariance 
property (Papo, 2014).  
Although a global Euclidean geometry 
may not be an appropriate description of 
global dynamics on the 
neurophysiological space, there is more 
than one way in which Φ can nonetheless 
Gauging functional brain activity 
3 
 
be equipped with a geometry. First, 
geometry may be derived from topology. 
Not only can a network always be 
embedded in a surface, provided it is of 
sufficiently high genus (roughly meaning 
it has a sufficient number of surface 
handles) (Aste et al., 2005), but geometry 
may also turn out to be an emergent 
property of the underlying topology 
(Bianconi and Rahmede, 2017). 
Furthermore, time series may be mapped 
into geometry (Amari and Nagaoka, 2007; 
Lesne, 2014; Ali et al., 2018). This can be 
done by representing observed brain 
activity in terms of probability 
distribution functions. This induces a 
smooth manifold M whose points are 
probability distributions defined on a 
common probability space (Amari and 
Nagaoka, 2007). Working with a 
probability distribution space allows 
recovering a continuous space even when 
the underlying state space is discrete, and 
representing brain activity as a 
geometrical structure. Fluctuations’ 
scaling properties may help equipping the 
space with a specific geometry. For 
instance, scale-free distributions suggest a 
fractal geometry, while accounting for the 
history-dependence of brain fluctuations 
may require a non-commutative one or a 
quasi-metric space.  
GAUGING IMAGING DATA 
Interpreting neuroimaging data requires 
introducing relations among 
experimental conditions and this, in turn, 
understanding the implications that given 
structures have on the definition of the 
families 𝒰𝜋  or, equivalently, 𝒱𝜋′ . 
Conversely, any interpretation introduces 
further structure which allows measuring 
quantities over the considered spaces. On 
the one hand, endowing data spaces with 
given structural properties induces 
specific equivalence classes. For instance, 
two dynamical systems are dynamically 
equivalent if they are topologically 
conjugate (Pasemann, 2002). More 
generally, observed data may be classified 
up to a given property (e.g. homotopy, 
conjugacy, symmetry, etc.) or according to 
obstructions to one of them. Conversely, 
comparing experimental conditions 
requires comparing their associated (e.g. 
network) structure, each structure 
involving its own set of operations 
restrictions, and sometimes adding 
further structure (Simas et al., 2015; 
Schieber et al., 2017; Gadyiaram et al., 
2017).  
At the most basic level, when 
comparing experimental conditions, one 
needs to evaluate the topological 
distinguishability of two sets 𝑉1  and 𝑉2  in 
Φ/′ and the corresponding 𝑈1 and 𝑈2 in 
Ψ/ . If one considers the basic field 
representation of neuroimaging data, this 
amounts to comparing two fields 𝑓𝑋  and 
𝑓𝑌 ,  a seemingly rather tractable task. 
Because the functional space is not 
everywhere isomorphic to the anatomical 
one at macroscopic scales, gauging 
distinguishability in terms of pattern 
similarity in the anatomical space (𝔈; 𝑑) 
can be misleading. Typical 
representations isomorphic to the 
anatomical space become difficult to 
compare when the subspace of Φ  has 
complex, e.g. non compact geometry. A 
number of factors, including noise and 
inter-individual differences, can render 
the distinguishability of Euclidean 
representations problematic. No less 
importantly, functional brain activity may 
be organized in patterns with similar 
meaning but considerably different 
underlying anatomical structure (Ganmor 
et al., 2015).  
The extent to which parcellations can 
be distinguished from each other is 
related to the separation properties on the 
space, which in turn determine the 
possible nature of functions and 
operations on the space (Dodson and 
Parker, 1997). The functional space is not 
necessarily a Hausdorff space, even when 
Φ is embedded in the cortical Euclidean 
space 𝔈. This is clearly the case for fuzzy 
relations (Grzegorzewski, 2017) or 
overlapping communities (Palla et al., 
2005). When neuroimaging data are 
endowed with a topological manifold 
representation, this situation is reflected 
by overlaps between charts of the 
manifold’s atlas, and transition functions 
are needed to resolve these areas. 
Once endowed with some structure, 
membership of a given equivalence class 
can be assessed using maximum entropy 
methods, and observed data are 
considered as an instance of an ensemble 
of objects with these properties (Bianconi, 
2007; Cimini et al., 2019). The functional 
significance of given representation can 
also be gauged by its ability to perform a 
given task, e.g. classification or prediction, 
(Zanin et al., 2016). 
Often, it is also necessary to quantify 
how far 𝑉1 and 𝑉2 and the corresponding 
𝑈1  and 𝑈2  are from each other. This 
implies defining some property intuitively 
translating the concept of distance. While 
the anatomically-embedded functional 
space can only locally be considered a 
Euclidean metric space, distances may be 
defined for other structures in a way that 
is dictated by the structure itself (Rossi et 
al., 2015; De Domenico and Biamonte, 
2016). When operating in a probability 
distribution space, Φ  can be equipped 
with the Fisher information metric e.g. by 
using the covariance matrix as a metric 
tensor (Crooks, 2007). This endows the 
space M of probability distributions with 
a Riemannian differential manifold 
structure (M, g, θ), where g is the Fisher-
Rao information metric and the 
parameters θ are probability measures 
giving the coordinates on this manifold. 
The Fisher metric converts parameter 
space distance into a unique measure of 
distinguishability between models (Amari 
and Nagaoka, 2007), and can be used to 
quantify the informational difference 
between measurements as well as the 
sensitivity of model predictions to 
changes in parameters (Machta et al., 
2013). On the other hand, whenever 
neuroimaging data can be treated as a 
dynamical system, a dynamical distance 
can be derived from the dynamics itself. 
This distance allows a coarse graining that 
is in some sense optimal with respect to 
the dynamics (Gaveau and Schulman, 
2005).  
Finally, irrespective of whether one is 
considering a static (e.g. network) 
structure or a dynamical system with an 
explicit dynamical rule, a metric can be 
induced using perturbation methods. 
Importantly, these methods can also help 
defining proximity relations in Φ (Peters, 
2016, 2018). 
FROM DYNAMICS TO FUNCTION 
To move from dynamical equivalence 
classes, comprising identical dynamical 
properties and specific phase and 
parameter space symmetries, to 
functional equivalence classes, comprising 
patterns of neural activity that can achieve 
given functional properties (Ma et al., 
2009) requires lifting 𝑇𝑆  to Φ Γ,⁄  and 
considering the structure induced by the 
dynamical system 𝑇𝑆Ψ : Φ Γ⁄ → Φ Γ⁄ . While 
dynamical properties may sometimes 
readily be interpreted in functional terms, 
e.g. the co-existence of different attractors 
points to multi-functionality of a given 
module or system (Pasemann, 2002), the 
dynamics-to-function transition may give 
rise to non-trivial properties that cannot 
be anticipated based on the dynamics 
alone. Important properties such a 
robustness may drastically change when 
moving from 𝑇𝑆 to 𝑇𝑆Ψ. 
While each recording technique’s 
precision induces specific a priori 
parcellations of Φ, these are in general not 
functionally relevant. To be functionally 
meaningful, metrics in Φ  need to be 
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appraised in the space Ψ made observable 
through Γ. To do so involves determining 
how properties in one structure are 
transferred onto those of the other. This is 
where the fundamental role of the map 𝜋 
(or 𝜋′) comes into play. Ideally, one seeks 
the finest topology in Φ/′  that renders 
the 𝜋: Γ → Φ  surjection continuous. This 
means endowing Φ  with the quotient 
topology with respect to 𝜋, i.e. the family 
𝒰𝜋 = {𝑉 | 𝜋
−1(𝑉) is open in Γ}.  In other 
words, from a neuroimaging view-point, 
functional brain activity can be thought of 
as a fibre bundle, i.e. a quadruple 
(Ψ, Φ, 𝜋, 𝒰𝜋), where Ψ is the total space, 
Φ  the base 𝜋: Ψ → Φ  a continuous 
surjective function called the fibre bundle 
projection, and 𝒰𝜋  the fibres. Φ  can 
ultimately be identified with a subspace of 
Ψ through a section of the fibre bundle, i.e. 
a continuous right inverse of the 
projection function 𝜋 defined on an open 
set of Φ.  Globally, the space Ψ  is not 
necessarily isomorphic to a Cartesian 
product Φ × 𝒰𝜋  but may result from 
gluing together several Cartesian 
products defined on local open domains of 
Φ. Transitions between the fibre bundle’s 
local trivializations may lie in a topological 
group, known as the structure group, 
acting on the fibres 𝒰𝜋 .  Moreover, Φ  is 
often implicitly assumed to be a 
measurable space. Measurability of the 
physiological space is used to induce 
measurability in the cognitive one; a -
algebra on Ψ  would then precisely be 
given by the counter-images of elements 
of the -algebra on Φ  induced by its 
topology. It is intuitive to understand 𝜋 as 
a homomorphism, i.e. a structure-
preserving map between algebraic 
structures, whenever Γ  can be equipped 
with a quasi-metric structure, as in spatial 
perception or sensory processes, and Φ is 
organized in topographic maps, so that 
neighbours in Γ have corresponding ones 
in the anatomical space Φ. But what are in 
practice 𝜋 ’s properties? Is it invertible, 
continuous, measurable, etc.? Is it an 
isometry? 
Before examining the 𝜋: Ψ → Φ  map, 
it is first worth recalling that system-level 
neuroimaging representations Φ𝑂𝑏𝑠  are 
in essence kinetic models averaging over 
Φ𝑁𝑂𝑏𝑠  stochasticities (Zaslavsky, 2002), 
i.e. there exists a non-observable map 
?̃?: Φ𝑁𝑂𝑏𝑠 → Φ𝑂𝑏𝑠.  The space induced by 
this map can show permutation symmetry 
but also combinatorial complexity with 
respect to more fine-grained Φ𝑁𝑂𝑏𝑠 
configurations (Brezina, 2010). An 
adequate coarse-graining of Φ𝑁𝑂𝑏𝑠 should 
preserve a microscopic state description 
exhibiting a given property, e.g. a 
symmetry (Cross and Gilmore, 2010), and 
the possibility to obtain a dynamical rule 
for the system (Allefeld et al., 2009). A 
faithful representation of the hidden 
structure at microscopic scales would 
require finding a generating partition, but 
this is in practice an excessively arduous 
task (Kantz and Schreiber, 2004). While 
macroscopic scale descriptions are stricto 
sensu dynamically emergent states only if 
they correspond to a Markov coarse-
graining of lower-level dynamics (Adler, 
1998; Shalizi and Moore, 2003; Bollt and 
Skufca, 2005; Gaveau and Schulman, 
2005; Allefeld et al., 2009), both Φ𝑂𝑏𝑠 and 
Γ can loosely be thought to emerge from 
the renormalization of neural activity at 
microscopic scales, i.e. at scales not 
observable with a given neuroimaging 
technique. The way microscopic scales 
renormalize into macroscopic ones can 
determine the scale at which the space is 
locally isomorphic to ℝ𝑛  and can 
effectively be treated as a topological 
manifold. This scale may be induced by 
permutation symmetry with respect to a 
given property at microscopic scales. Thus, 
macroscopic parcellations in the 
anatomical space may consist of 
topographical regions for which such 
symmetry holds. On the other hand, 
whether and to what extent 
Φ𝑂𝑏𝑠′s topological properties actually 
reflect those of Φ𝑁𝑂𝑏𝑠  is not always 
entirely clear. For example, the robust 
computational properties associated with 
motifs in microcircuits (Klemm and 
Bornholdt, 2005; Gollo and Breakspear, 
2014) do not necessarily characterize 
structurally isomorphic circuits at 
macroscopic scales. 
The Φ𝔈 → Ψ map associated with the 
lesion-based framework is in general ill-
defined. This is due to the fuzzy lesion 
contour geometry but, more importantly, 
1) to the fact that the functional space is 
only locally a metric one, 2) to Φ𝔈′𝑠 lack of 
temporal dimension, so that the resulting 
𝒰𝜋 is too low-dimensional to capture the 
complexity of both Φ and Ψ; and 3) to the 
brain’s degeneracy. In a degenerate 
system, structurally different elements 
give rise to the same output. A localized 
lesion in a degenerate system may 
produce no cognitive deficit, and it is 
impossible to establish if a lesioned brain 
region is a necessary part of a system 
subserving a given cognitive process 
(Price and Friston, 2002).  
A well-behaved Φ → Ψ  map can 
sometimes be obtained. A notable 
example is represented by Kelso’s 
bimanual motor coordination paradigm, 
which requires coordinating finger 
movements and following a pacing 
metronome whose oscillation frequency 
is systematically increased (Kelso, 1995). 
Once the relative phase ϕ between the 
fingers is chosen as the order parameter 
describing the dynamics, Φ  and Ψ  are 
both differentiable and Ψ turns out to be 
diffeomorphic to the macroscopic velocity 
field ∇ ∙ Φ, which in turn can be thought of 
as collective modes of underlying 
neurophysiological activity (Kelso et al., 
1998). In this special case, the functional 
space can be considered as a smooth fibre 
bundle, as total space, base and fibre are 
all smooth manifolds and𝜋  is surjective. 
However, in most contexts, it is hard to 
describe objects in Ψ  in terms of 
differential equations or even more 
general dynamical rules, and the Ψ → Φ 
map is non-trivial.  
While a smooth manifold 
representation of Φ  may not always be 
available, relatively well-behaved 
mappings may occur in other contexts as 
well. For instance, brain networks display 
generic hierarchical structure (Meunier et 
al., 2010), a structure that may be 
mirrored both by brain dynamics’ 
temporal fluctuations and by a 
corresponding hierarchical one in Ψ.  An 
example may be represented by linguistic 
functions may be defined in terms of 
hierarchical relations, rules and 
operations.  
FROM MEASURE TO ACCESSIBILITY 
In a sense, proximity, neighbourhood and 
distances lato sensu are usually quantified 
in terms of static representations, both for 
truly quasi-static data as fMRI images, and 
for dynamic ones such as EEG recordings. 
However, all these properties actually 
depend on the way one state in Φ Γ⁄  may 
be transformed into another under some 
neurophysiological process.  
To understand how the properties of 
the dynamical space are inherited by the 
functional space, one may think of 
neurophysiological processes being only 
partially observable at the system level of 
non-invasive neuroimaging techniques, as 
genotype, and of observed behaviour or 
macroscopic brain activity as the 
corresponding phenotype, resulting from 
coarse-graining of physiological 
processes. The crucial question is: what 
space does the genotype-to-phenotype 
map induce?  
A smooth genotype-to-phenotype 
map can sometimes be ensured. For 
instance, in Kelso’s paradigm (Kelso et al., 
1998), possible functional discontinuities 
in Ψ can be explained in terms of genuine 
brain dynamics, as brain dynamics has the 
structure of a differentiable manifold, i.e. a 
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topological manifold with an atlas whose 
transition functions are differentiable, 
allowing for differential calculus on the 
manifold. Function is then defined in 
terms of dynamical variables, i.e. 
synchronization and syncopation; 
components and collective variables in Ψ 
can both be endowed with explicit 
differentiable analytical expressions, and 
cognitive demands can be construed as 
their boundary conditions (Kelso, 1995).  
However, the structure induced by the 
Ψ → Φ  map may be highly non-trivial 
(Stadler et al., 2001): not only may the 
phenotype space induced by the 
dynamical system 𝑇𝑆Ψ : Φ Γ⁄ → Φ Γ⁄  be a 
non-metric one, but even the less 
stringent notion of topology may need to 
be relaxed (Stadler et al., 2001; Stadler, 
2006). This can be understood in terms of 
accessibility in the genotype space and of 
the genotype-to-phenotype map. Whether 
defined on Ψ  or Φ,  a robust dynamical 
notion of nearness and neighbourhood in 
the phenotype space should reflect the 
genotype space’s accessibility structure, 
i.e. the variation operators establishing 
which configurations are accessible from 
given ones should reflect the dynamics of 
physiological processes. Ultimately, to 
define accessibility requires 
understanding which phenotypic 
variations are neurophysiologically 
neutral and which ones are realizable in 
the neighbourhood of underlying 
neuronal variations. Since accessibility 
lacks symmetry in general, nearness in the 
induced space would be non-symmetric. 
Furthermore, important dynamical 
patterns of observed activity, including 
intermittency, degeneracy, redundancy, 
and robustness could be dynamic 
manifestations of the phenotype’s 
topological properties induced by the 
genotype-to-phenotype map. Ultimately 
functional complexity is driven by the 
robustness induced by neutrality in the 
genotype (Doyle and Csete, 2011). This 
clarifies the distinction between 
structural, dynamical and functional 
robustness (Lesne, 2008). 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Defining functional brain activity and 
ultimately how the brain implements 
given functions are arduous tasks. Here 
we did not address this general 
ontological issue, nor did we address the 
comparably complex issue of (state space) 
reconstruction from data, but a rather 
more circumscribed methodological 
question: how does the structure that 
available neuroimaging are endowed with 
determine our ability to extract genuine 
functional brain activity?  
What is observed of the brain per se 
without a definition of structure is an 
instance of dynamics or whatever is used 
to describe Φ.  For example, so-called 
functional networks, constructed based 
on some dynamical coupling metric 
between brain regions (Bullmore and 
Sporns 2009) should in general more 
appropriately be referred to as dynamical. 
Genuine functional networks can instead 
be thought of as partitions or macrostates 
(Shalizi and Moore, 2003; Allefeld et al., 
2009; Wolpert et al., 2014) of dynamical 
ones, and functional activity as a process 
unfolding on the network (Papo et al., 
2014b). Characterizing functional 
equivalence classes requires an 
appropriate auxiliary space, whose 
properties are those of the superstructure 
with which observed data are equipped. 
Likewise, observed activity can be 
understood as functional or purely 
dynamical in a given variable in a scale- 
and technique-dependent manner. Thus, 
while it is still unclear what 
neurophysiological function should be 
ascribed to it in general, spontaneous 
brain activity should be treated as a 
dynamical rather than a functional 
phenomenon when observed at time-
scales much shorter than those of its 
generic properties (Papo, 2013).  
Though not necessarily the case, some 
structures used in data analysis, viz. in 
topological data analysis, may reflect the 
way function impacts on brain dynamics. 
The brain can be thought of as a 
“geometric engine”, implementing 
structures (e.g. fibre bundles) through 
task-specific functional architectures, 
hard-wired anatomical apparatus 
together with some dynamics 
(Koenderink and van Dorn, 1987; Moser 
and Moser, 2008), with non-random 
topological properties (Curto et al., 2017; 
Giusti et al., 2015) and (possibly non-
Euclidean) geometry (Petitot, 2013, 2017). 
Moreover, representing brain data as 
probability distributions allows 
characterizing function as a perturbation 
of the functional form of brain dynamics, 
amplitude or frequency modulations 
representing a short temporal scales 
special case (Papo, 2014). This 
representation induces a space of 
functions on Φ  straightforwardly 
mirroring the of non-observable space Ψ. 
Furthermore, such a representation 
would naturally come with a metric and 
would allow estimating important aspects 
such as the cost of moving from one 
probability distribution function to 
another (Kempes et al., 2017).  
Topological signal processing tools 
are consistent with information locality in 
some domain (space, time, frequency, etc.) 
(Robinson, 2013a). On the other hand, 
functional neuroimaging often boils down 
to a dynamic way of addressing the 
definition of cortical area. In spite of novel 
preparations, imaging and optical 
methods, quantitative architectonics, and 
high-performance computing the criteria 
for defining a cortical area are typically 
based on structure-function associations 
at the level of cortical areas in the 
anatomical space (Amunts and Zilles, 
2015). The underlying assumption is that 
information is (locally) compact in the 
anatomical support. However, the brain 
may show genuine non-locality, i.e. 
interaction-induced emergence as 
opposed to bare anatomical connectivity, 
and the role of non-local information 
cannot be neglected (Santos et al., 2018). 
Embedding into a metric space may 
overshadow important aspects of its 
structure (Vaccarino et al., 2015); it may 
then be useful to represent Φ as a space 
that does not derive its topology from a 
metric, and to resort to representations 
that are non-local in (𝔈; 𝑑) (Baruchi and 
Ben-Jacob, 2004; Petri et al., 2014). Such 
spaces allow treating the multiplicity of 
observables, observation scales and 
possibly geometries and defining 
relationships between geometric objects 
constructed using different parameter 
values, and continuous maps relating 
these objects (Carlsson, 2009).  
Endowing Φ with a structure involves 
discretionary choices at various levels 
somehow associated with assumptions on 
what should be regarded as functional in 
brain activity, introducing circularity 
between definition and quantification of 
functional brain activity (Papo et al., 
2014b). For instance, there are no criteria 
to elect the space to be equipped with a 
network structure, and to define its 
boundaries, constituent nodes and edges 
(Papo et al., 2014a). Brain function 
“stylized facts”, topological and 
geometrical concepts, and thorough 
behavioural studies (Krakauer et al., 2017) 
may all help defining and quantifying 
brain function. Finally, functional 
representations should highlight 
neurophysiological mechanisms i.e. 
“entities and activities organized in such a 
way that they are responsible for the 
phenomenon” (Illari and Williamson, 
2012). Whether at the computational, 
algorithmic or implementation level 
(Marr, 1982), mechanistic functional 
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descriptions may help determining when 
the functional space can be endowed with 
a given representation, e.g. a network 
representation, how reproducible it is, 
and when this representation ceases to be 
appropriate, and may ultimately have an 
impact on the ability to predict and act 
upon brain activity. 
APPENDIX 
 A topology on a set 𝑋 is a collection T of 
subsets of X, called open sets, satisfying 
a set of axiomatic properties. The pair (X, 
T) constitutes a topological space. 
 A Hausdorff space is a topological space 
with a separation property, i.e. any two 
points can be separated by disjoint open 
sets. 
 The quotient space 𝑋 ~⁄  of a topological 
space 𝑋  and an equivalence relation ~ 
on 𝑋 is the set of equivalence classes of 
points in 𝑋  under ~  together with the 
quotient topology. The quotient topology 
consists of all sets with an open 
preimage under the canonical 
projection which maps each element to 
its equivalence class.  
 A topological dynamical system is a 
topological space, together with a 
semigroup of continuous 
transformations of that space. 
 An n-dimensional manifold is a 
topological space where each point has 
a neighbourhood that is homeomorphic 
to ℝ𝑁 .  
 A topological manifold is a locally 
Euclidean Hausdorff space.  
 A paracompact space is a topological 
space in which every open cover has a 
locally finite open refinement i.e. every 
point of the space has a neighbourhood 
that intersects only finitely many sets in 
the cover. 
 A cover of a set X is a collection of sets 
whose union contains X as a subset. 
 A differentiable manifold is a topological 
manifold equipped with an equivalence 
class of atlases with differentiable 
transition maps or functions. A 
differentiable manifold allows defining 
tangent vectors and directional 
derivatives. If each transition function is 
a smooth map, the atlas is called a 
smooth atlas, and the manifold itself is 
called smooth. 
 A chart of a topological space is a 
homeomorphism from an open subset U 
of X to an open subset of ℝ𝑁 .  
 An atlas of a topological space X is a 
collection of charts on X.  
 Transition maps provide a way of 
comparing two charts of an atlas.  
 A fibre bundle is a space that is locally a 
product space, but may have a different 
global topological structure. The 
similarity between a space E (total space) 
and a product space 𝐵 × 𝐹  (where B is 
the base space, and F the fibre) is defined 
using a continuous surjective map 
𝜋: 𝐸 → 𝐵 (projection of the bundle) that 
in small regions of E behaves like a 
projection 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗1: 𝐵 × 𝐹 → 𝐵. 
 An atlas defines the structure of a fibre 
bundle if the transition maps between its 
charts preserve local trivializations. In a 
fibre bundle, transition maps represent 
changes in the parameterization of a 
fibre. 
 A vector bundle over a space X (e.g. a 
topological space, a manifold, etc.) is a 
particular fibre bundle the fibre of 
which has vector field structure. A 
vector bundle results from the 
association of every point x of the space 
X with a vector space V(x) so that the 
resulting vector spaces form a space of 
the same kind as X. A vector bundle is in 
essence a family of vector spaces 
parameterized by another space X. 
 A fibre bundle section is a continuous 
right inverse of the projection function 
𝜋 which assigns in a continuous manner 
a value of the fibre from the attached 
space to every point of the base. In 
general, fibre bundles do not have global 
sections, and sections are defined locally. 
Local sections play the same role as 
vector fields in an open subset of a 
topological space.  
 Local sections form a sheaf over the base, 
called the sheaf of the sections of a space.  
 A sheaf is a topological object through 
which locally defined data attached to 
the open sets of a topological space can 
be systematically tracked. Obstructions 
to the existence of a section can 
sometimes be measured by a 
cohomology class.  
 Two flows 𝑓: A → A  and 𝑔: B → B  are 
topologically equivalent if there exists a 
homeomorphism ℎ: A → B  that maps 
the orbits of 𝑓 onto the orbits of 𝑔 and 
preserves the direction of time.  
 Two flows 𝑓: A → A  and 𝑔: B → B  are 
topologically conjugate if there is a 
homeomorphism ℎ: A → B  such that 
𝑔 ◦ ℎ = ℎ ◦ 𝑓 
 Generally speaking, interpreting data 
means transitioning from a measurable 
space (𝑋, 𝛴) to measure space (𝑋, 𝛴, 𝜇), 
where 𝑋  is a set, 𝛴  a -algebra on 
𝑋, and 𝜇: 𝛴 → ℝ𝑁  a finite measure on 
the -algebra. A probability space is a 
particular measure space where 𝜇  is a 
probability measure. 
 A -algebra on a set X is a collection Σ of 
subsets of X that includes the null set ∅ 
and the entire space X, and is closed 
under complement and countable 
unions.  
 From a measure-theoretical viewpoint, 
a dynamical system is a measure-
preserving transformation of a -
algebra, i.e. a quadruple (𝑋, Σ, 𝜇, 𝜏) , 
where 𝜏: 𝑋 → 𝑋 is a measure-preserving 
transformation of X. A map 𝜏: 𝑋 → 𝑋 is a 
measure-preserving transformation of X 
if it is Σ-measurable, and is measure-
preserving. 𝜏 is Σ-measurable if and only 
if for every 𝜎 ∈ 𝛴 , 𝜏−1𝜎 ∈ Σ  and 
preserves the measure if and only if for 
every 𝜎 ∈ Σ, 𝜇(𝜏−1𝜎) = 𝜇(𝜎). 
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